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Courts have almost uniformly refused to classify written words or an idea
as a "product" for purposes of imposing the various forms of products liabil-
ity. By creating artificial distinctions between the intellectual or intangible
component of a product, such as a recipe in a cookbook or computer
software on a disk, and the product's tangible characteristics, courts have
often left plaintiffs without any redress, whether the claims sounded in negli-
gence, warranty, or strict liability.'
Cardozo v. True2 best exemplifies the artificial analytical distinctions em-
ployed by the courts in this context. In Cardozo, the plaintiff used the de-
fendant's cookbook to prepare a recipe calling for the Dasheen plant root,
poisonous to humans when consumed uncooked.' She was injured when she
tasted the root while preparing the dish.4 The court rejected the plaintiff's
warranty claim against the publisher.' "[B]ooks are goods,"6 the court al-
lowed, "[b]ut, at this point it becomes necessary to distinguish between the
tangible properties of these goods and the thoughts and ideas conveyed
thereby."7 Accordingly, warranty liability was disallowed on the grounds
that it could extend only to "the physical properties of such books and...
not... to the material communicated by the book's author or publisher."'
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. J.D. 1988,
Cornell Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Prof. Clifford Shapiro, for the
concept, the encouragement, and the last-minute obliteration; Prof. James Henderson, for the
interest and the feedback; Darlene Vorachek, for the occasionally polite yet essentially brutal
input; Mary Nasenbenny, for the unerringly humble slave labor; Prof. Stephen McJohn, for
injecting a healthy note of apathy; and Prof. Anita Bernstein, for the early and good-naturedly
cynical commentary.
1. See, e.g., Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1990) ("As far as we have
been able to ascertain ... strict liability has never been extended to words or pictures.").
2. 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
3. Id. at 1054.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1057.
6. Id. at 1056.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1057.
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Courts make an unprincipled distinction by recognizing compensable
damage resulting from, for example, an unreasonable risk of paper cuts from
a cookbook,9 rather than the hazardous, and eminently foreseeable, con-
sumption of one of the ingredients specifically called for in a recipe therein.
Moreover, such artificial distinctions unnecessarily limit and often com-
pletely deny recovery to injured consumers. Furthermore, they needlessly
shield suppliers of defective goods from the normative influences of the
American system of strict liability. 10
Courts have their reasons for straining to avoid the imposition of liability
when the intellectual or intangible aspects of a product cause injury. Most
courts are wary of the potential chilling effects on First Amendment" rights
that could accompany holding a party liable in implied warranty, negligence,
or strict liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 2
for that party's disseminated words or ideas. 3 Courts and commentators
have feared the burdens that might be placed upon publishers of products
that contain words or ideas which could cause injury, including the pressure
to independently investigate the characteristics of the words or ideas sold to
a potentially "indeterminate class" of plaintiffs who might sustain injury for
an "indeterminate time."4
9. In response to a petition to regulate textbooks containing inadequate instructions for
science experiments, the Consumer Product Safety Commission noted that the books were
clearly "consumer products," but the Commission's jurisdiction could not extend beyond the
properties of a book that might cause physical injury, such as sharp edges, to the contents of
the books themselves. 40 Fed. Reg. 10,227 (1975).
10. For a brief review of European law's treatment of this subject area, see Simon Whitta-
ker, European Product Liability and Intellectual Products, 105 LAW Q. REV. 125 (1989).
11. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
13. See infra notes 30-69 and accompanying text.
14. See Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931); see also Lewin v. Mc-
Creight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F.
Supp. 990, 992-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263,
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In addressing these claims, however, courts have failed to properly adjudi-
cate the tort and products liability considerations presented by the plaintiffs,
never substantively addressing the threshold question of whether or not
what caused the injury must be categorized as a product. Moreover, these
courts' sweeping deference to unsubstantiated free speech concerns is incon-
sistent with traditional First Amendment analysis. This Article contends
that the imposition of liability in this context would be both appropriate and
consistent with tort and products liability jurisprudence. By implementing
the doctrine put forward in this Article, the imposition of such liability
would also be constitutionally sound.
Accordingly, this Article proposes the creation of a "commercial intellect
products liability" doctrine which would allow for the equitable and consti-
tutional imposition of strict liability where the intellectual aspects of a prod-
uct introduced into the stream of commerce proximately cause physical
injury. More specifically, the commercial intellect products liability doc-
trine, proposed herein, would define a product,'5 for purposes of strict liabil-
ity, 16 as:
1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Andrew T. Bayman, Note, Strict Liability for Defective Ideas in
Publications, 42 VAND. L. REV. 557, 576 (1989); infra note 45 (discussing Lewin); infra text
accompanying notes 31-34 (discussing Demuth); infra text accompanying notes 38-45 (discuss-
ing Aim).
15. While this doctrine specifically defines "product," courts tend to characterize the un-
derlying policy rationales of tort and products liability and then determine whether a particu-
lar item is a product on a case-by-case basis. See James P. Maloney, What Is or Is Not a
Product Within the Meaning of Section 402A, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 627 (1974); Bayman,
supra note 14, at 562.
Only eleven states have statutorily defined "product" for purposes of strict liability. All
have relied upon the general notion of tangibility. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-681
(1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102 (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001
(1989); IDAHO CODE §§ [6-1402], 6-1302 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213
(1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-2 (West Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53
(West 1991); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-311 (1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.71 (Anderson 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.010 (West 1991).
16. This Article introduces the doctrine of commercial intellect products liability in the
context of strict liability. Many of the cases which have previously considered such products
also arose in the contexts of warranty products liability and negligence products liability. The
carry-over effect of this Article's recategorization of certain items as products could naturally
impact upon negligence products liability, including negligent misrepresentation, which is cur-
rently limited to unpublished representations. See Steven J. Weingarten, Note, Tort Liability
for Nonlibellous Negligent Statements: First Amendment Considerations, 93 YALE L.J. 744,
756 (1984).
To the extent that the commercial intellect doctrine might also affect warranty liability by
virtue of altering the definition of a good, most of the analysis in this Article would apply. The
application of commercial intellect products liability to the Uniform Commercial Code is,
however, beyond the scope of this Article.
19921
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Any item introduced into the stream of commerce, including the
intangible (or intellectual) aspects of the item, where those aspects:
(1) contribute to the product's economic value, and (2) are reason-
ably expected by an ordinary consumer to be an integrated method
or blueprint that is directly useable, as opposed to indirectly usea-
ble only after further input on that same matter, and as opposed to
merely pondered and appreciated.
With this proposed definition, this Article first reviews those cases that
involved what this Article has defined as a "commercial intellect" product
and reviews their reception in products liability.' 7 This Article then details
the courts' and commentators' First Amendment concerns with liability in
this context.'" Next, this Article defends commercial intellect products lia-
bility as constitutional, viable, and essential, and sets out the appropriate
analytical framework in tort, products liability, and First Amendment juris-
prudence.' 9 Finally, this Article delineates the mechanics of commercial in-
tellect liability, applying the product definition to demonstrate what is and
what is not a "product" under the doctrine20 and explaining how "defect" is
to be defined in this context.2 '
II. A SURVEY OF COMMERCIAL INTELLECT CASES AND THEIR
EMPIRICAL RECEPTION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
With few exceptions,22 courts have failed to employ traditional methods
of principled adjudication when faced with commercial intellect product
cases (that is, cases involving products whose injury-producing characteris-
tics are based upon words or ideas rather than tangible attributes). A survey
of these cases highlights their analytical deficiencies.
A. The Exception: Instances of Intangible Products Liability
There have been two contexts wherein courts have imposed or at least
impliedly accepted the imposition of products liability for words or ideas.
The first context is limited to those cases involving aeronautical charts.23
The California Court of Appeals, for example, stated:
17. See infra text accompanying notes 22-69.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 70-98.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 99-184.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 185-93.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 193-97.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 23-29.
23. See Brocklesby v. United States, 753 F.2d 794 (holding air instrument approach chart
to be a product for § 402A purposes), amended on other grounds, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D.
Conn. 1982) (same), aff'd, Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983); Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 463 F. Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1978) (same), vacated and
[Vol. 41:617
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[A]lithough a sheet of paper might not be dangerous, per se, it
would be difficult indeed to conceive of a salable commodity with
more inherent lethal potential than an aid to aircraft navigation
that, contrary to its own design standards, fails to list the highest
land mass immediately surrounding a landing site. 4
These cases have never been followed in other commercial intellect con-
texts. Typically, these other contexts are summarily distinguished with no
principled analysis.2 5
The only other case that has allowed liability for commercial intellect is
Kercsmar v. Pen Argyl Area School District.2 6 In Kercsmar, a Pennsylvania
court held that a claim for failure to warn could be brought against the
publisher, printer, and seller of a high school chemistry textbook.27 This
cause of action was based on a chemistry experiment in the book.28 The
court stated in a footnote that "[a] book, such as that which is the subject of
a portion of this lawsuit, might well prove to be a defective product within
the ever-expanding field of products liability.
' 29
While these cases represent logical approaches to commercial intellect
claims, they are decidedly an exception to the general rule barring liability.
B. The Rule: Artificial and Unprincipled Distinctions Denying Liability
for Intellectual Products
With the narrow exceptions discussed above, courts have not applied the
various forms of products liability when addressing commercial intellect
products that have caused injury. These opinions are remarkable for their
lack of reasoned analysis within the traditional products liability rubric,
which enforces legislatively-mandated methods of adjudication for all prod-
ucts alleged to have caused injury. The opinions typically begin with the
remanded on other grounds, 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981); Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 593 P.2d
924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (same); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985) (same).
24. Fluor Corp., 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
25. See, e.g., Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp 1216, 1217-18 (D. Md. 1988) ("No
case has extended Section 402A to the dissemination of an idea or knowledge in books ....
Accordingly [this] [c]ourt will not .... ).
Perhaps the best explanation for the courts refusal to apply the rationale of the chart cases
to other commercial intellect product cases centers on the nature of the defect. The chart cases
present a compellingly verifiable manufacturing defect. The concept of defect in the context of
warnings accompanying a recipe in a cookbook, for example, is admittedly more problematic.
26. 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 1 (1976); see also K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group, 489 F.
Supp. 813 (D. Conn. 1980) (assuming, arguendo, that an architectural plan could be consid-
ered a product).
27. Kercsmar, 1 Pa. D. & C.3d at 8.
28. Id. at 2.
29. Id. at 7 n.7.
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unsupported conclusion that products liability in that context is
unacceptable, with little or no reasoning concerning the threshold question
of whether what is alleged to have caused injury is really a product. The
most frequent and troubling setting in which these cases arise involves tor-
tious injury allegedly caused by the written word in a product.3"
The first reported case to have encountered a commercial intellect claim
appears to be Demuth Development Corp. v. Merck & Co.,3 which was de-
cided in 1977. Demuth rejected a negligence claim for liability where the
injury resulted from the use of an encyclopedia of chemicals and drugs
which allegedly misstated the toxicity of a chemical.32 The court failed to
address whether the information in the encyclopedia was a product. In-
stead, the court focused on the issues of reliance and duty, declaring, with-
out further explanation, that even an expectation of reliance upon the
written word in a commercial context failed to satisfy privity concerns and
establish a duty of due care to those proximately affected by errors.33 The
court deferred to other authorities that had refused to hold liable dissemina-
tors of allegedly defective words used in the commercial context and warned
of "[t]he specter of unlimited liability, with claims devastating in number
and amount."
34
Subsequently, a New York trial court in Walter v. Bauer3- rejected a
young student's strict liability claim for eye injuries sustained while attempt-
ing to perform a science experiment involving a ruler and a rubber band
described in the defendant's textbook. 36 The court distinguished the con-
tents of the book from the book itself, saying only:
[The textbook] cannot be said to be a defective product, for the
infant plaintiff was not injured by use of the book for the purpose
for which it was designed, i.e., to be read. More importantly per-
haps, the danger of plaintiff's proposed theory is the chilling effect
30. A second group of cases in which courts have refused to characterize words or ideas in
the stream of commerce as products is found in the incitement context. While these opinions
do not always consider imposing products liability, per se, commercial intellect liability was
arguably at issue. For example, in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803
(S.D. Tex. 1983), the plaintiffs brought an action which included strict liability claims against
the publisher of an article detailing the practice of autoerotic asphyxiation. The plaintiffs' son
and brother were found dead of asphyxiation under circumstances strongly suggesting adher-
ence to the details in the defendant's article. Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, stat-
ing only: "The Court is aware of no court which has held that the content of a magazine or
other publication is a product within the meaning of § 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts." Id.
31. 432 F. Supp 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
32. Id. at 995.
33. Id. at 993.
34. Id. (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 708 (4th ed. 1971)).
35. 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1981), modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1982).
36. Id. at 822.
(Vol. 41:617
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it would have on the First Amendment-freedoms of speech and
press. Would any author wish to be exposed to liability for writing
on a topic which might result in physical injury, e.g., how to cut
trees; how to keep bees?"
Similarly, in Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. ," a plaintiff sought relief
against the author and the publisher of a "How To" book entitled The Mak-
ing of Tools.a9 The plaintiff was injured when a tool shattered while he alleg-
edly was following the instructions in the book for making that tool.'
Referring to a number of cases that had rejected products liability in the
context of the written word,4" the Illinois Court of Appeals would not apply
section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts42 to establish liability based
37. Id. at 822-23. See also Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc., 494 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976
(Sup. Ct. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 499 N.Y.S.2d 558 (App. Div. 1986), in which the court
began with the proposition that intellect could not constitute a product and thus rejected strict
product liability, conduct-based negligence, id. at 978, and warranty liability. Id The plaintiff
in Beasock brought suit alleging injuries caused, in part, by incorrect dimensional standards for
tires, tire rims, and associated parts published by one of the defendants. Id. The court distin-
guished the contents of the publication from the product, holding:
The only products TRA is responsible for placing in the stream of commerce are its
publications. Although these publications contained the dimensional specifications
for the tire and rim in question, the publications themselves did not produce the
injuries and thus cannot serve as the basis for the imposition of liability under a
theory of either strict products liability or breach of warranty.
Id. at 978.
38. 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
39. Id. at 1264.
40. Ide
41. See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (holding book publisher
not liable when cookbook purchaser was injured by consuming poisonous ingredient listed in
recipe), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977); MacKown v. Illinois Publishing & Printing
Co., 6 N.E.2d 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) (holding newspaper not liable for injury caused by use
of product recommended in an article); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1974) (ruling that magazine was not liable for injury caused by fireworks advertised
therein); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (holding accountant not lia-
ble to third party who relied on balance sheet to loan money to company that later defaulted);
Jaillet v. Cashman, 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (finding no liability for monetary loss
caused by reliance on erroneous broker's report), aff'd, 194 N.Y.S. 947 (App. Div. 1922),
aff'd, 139 N.E. 714 (N.Y. 1923)
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965), entitled "Negligent Misrepresenta-
tion Involving Risk of Physical Harm," provides:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon
such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the
action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
19921
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on the theory of negligent misrepresentation.4 3 The court rejected the idea
that publishers owe a duty to consumers for information supplied by third
parties" and cited the potential chilling effect upon First Amendment rights
if publishers were required to scrutinize or test all procedures contained in
their publications.4 5
In L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,46 the plaintiff brought a
products liability claim for damages resulting from dissemination of an alleg-
edly inaccurate credit report issued by the defendant. The federal district
court rejected the applicability of products liability law, distinguishing be-
tween intangible products and "products of a more tangible nature., 47 To
support this distinction, the court noted the absence of case law and state
statutory law categorizing the intellectual content of an item as a "product"
for purposes of products liability.4" As in Walter and Alm, the court
expressed First Amendment concerns, stating that liability in this con-
text "would be just a short step from the imposition of liability without fault
on an investigative reporter, a political columnist or a documentary
filmmaker.",
49
43. Aim, 480 N.E.2d at 1267.
44. Id. at 1266; see also Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988). In
Jones, the court rejected the liability claim of a nursing student who was injured when she
relied upon information published in a nursing textbook. The court reasoned that because the
defendant merely published the text, it had "no duty of care to plaintiff with respect to the
content of the book." Id. at 1217.
45. Aim, 480 N.E.2d at 1267; see also Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich.
1987), where the plaintiff was injured by an explosion allegedly resulting from following the
mixing directions in the book The Complete Metalsmith. The court held that the publisher
owed the reader no duty regarding the intellectual product aspects of the book. Id. at 283-84.
The court analyzed the strict liability and negligence claims by addressing the duty of a pub-
lisher to the reading public. Id. at 283. The court adopted the rationale of Aim and empha-
sized that the publisher had "merely printed and bound a book, the contents of which were
written by a third-party author." Id. Citing excessive burdens on a publisher in this context
and "potentially unlimited liability," id. at 284, the court held that, upon "a balancing of the
societal interest involved," id., the imposition of a duty of due care was inappropriate. Id.
Inexplicably, the court added that:
The [duty] balance might well come out differently, however, if the publisher contrib-
uted some of the content of the book. The burden of determining whether the con-
tent was accurate would be less than in the present case. Similarly, publishers may
have greater responsibilities where the risk of harm is plain and severe such as a book
entitled How To Make Your Own Parachute.
Id.
46. 629 F. Supp. 1425 (D. Conn. 1986).
47. Id. at 1430; see also First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 180
(2d Cir. 1989) (holding that publisher of summary of terms of securities package could not be
held to be liable for negligent misstatements); Jaillet v. Cashman, 194 N.Y.S. 947 (App. Div.
1922) (ruling that disseminators of financial information are immunized from tort liability for
non-defamatory negligent misstatements).
48. L. Cohen, 629 F. Supp. at 1430.
49. Id. at 1431.
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In a Pennsylvania case, Smith v. Linn,"° the plaintiff alleged that his wife's
death was caused by her strict adherence to the protein diet program es-
poused in the defendant's book, The Last Chance Diet.5 After considering
two other cases that distinguished the tangible and intangible aspects of a
product,5 2 the court held that the contents of the diet book did not constitute
a product, stating that "no appellate court in any jurisdiction has held a
book to be a product for purposes of section 402A. ' '53 The court distin-
guished contrary language in Kercsmar,5 4 summarily declaring that the
chemistry textbook case was "not dispositive" because the discussion in that
opinion had centered upon the U.C.C. classification of a "good.", 55 The
Smith court declared that it was not bound by the Kercsmar view, which, it
noted, no other court had accepted. 6
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also
rejected the imposition of liability in the commercial intellect context. In
Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 7 the plaintiffs brought suit for injuries alleg-
edly resulting from picking and eating poisonous mushrooms after relying
upon information in a mushroom encyclopedia published by the defend-
ants.58 The court, in a comparatively thoughtful opinion, rejected liability,
holding that a "product" for purposes of strict liability could not include
published words and ideas.59 The court supported its opinion with examples
of items listed in the comments to Section 402A of the Second Restatement,
noting that all of them are tangible items.' °
The plaintiffs proposed that California courts decline to draw a line be-
tween physical products and the intangible ideas incorporated therein and
cited Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co.,6 a case dealing with liability for the
50. 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (per curiam).
51. Id. at 125.
52. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Cardozo v.
True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert denied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977).
53. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126.
54. 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 1 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
55. Smith, 563 A.2d at 127.
56. Id.
57. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 1036.
59. Id. at 1034. The court also rejected the imposition of negligence liability:
We conclude that the defendants have no duty to investigate the accuracy of the
contents of the books it publishes. A publisher may of course assume such a burden,
but there is nothing inherent in the role of publisher or the surrounding legal doc-
trines to suggest that such a duty should be imposed on publishers.
Id. at 1037 (footnote omitted). Applying the same analysis, the court also rejected plaintiffs'
contention that defendants should have warned readers of the incompleteness of the informa-
tion in the encyclopedia and specifically disavowed any guarantee of accuracy. Id. at 1037-38.
60. Id. at 1034-35 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (1965)).
61. 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1985).
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contents of aeronautical charts. 62 The court rejected the argument. In its
footnote response, the court emphasized the physical property components
of the aeronautical chart cases.63 It explained that aeronautical charts are
actually tools which graphically depict technical and mechanical data.6 In
contrast, the court continued, an encyclopedia is a book on how to use tech-
nical tools.
65
Finally, the court explained its First Amendment concerns, noting "a high
priority on the unfettered exchange of ideas,",66 and added that society was
willing to accept the attendant risks.67 The court then rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that First Amendment concerns "would be groundless were strict
liability rules applied only to books that give instruction on how to accom-
plish a physical activity and that are intended to be used as part of an activ-
ity that is inherently dangerous. ,68 Referring to unexplained barriers to
drawing "such a bright line," the court declared the plaintiffs' limitation
analysis "illusory."69
III. FIRST AMENDMENT OBJECTIONS TO THE IMPOSITION OF
COMMERCIAL INTELLECT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. 70 is often cited as one of the great constitutional barriers to liability in
cases arguably falling within the commercial intellect context. 71 In Gertz,
the Court held that, in the context of defamation, states are free to "define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual, ' 72 but only
so long as such liability was not imposed without fault.7 a The argument that
courts and commentators have derived from Gertz is that strict liability,
62. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036 n.4 (citing the Fluor case, wherein plaintiffs alleged plane
crash was attributable to erroneous altitude specifications of hills surrounding airport); see
supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1036.
65. Id. (emphasis in original). In a puzzling aside, the court also noted that computer
software may be another example of a "tool" word or idea, rather than a "product" word or
idea. Id.




70. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
71. See, e.g., Hammerhead Enters., Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40, in holding that "the Constitution
does not permit the imposition of liability for expressing so-called 'false ideas' "); see also Jones
v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988); supra note 44.




which is at least formally considered liability without fault,74 cannot be ap-
plied constitutionally to words or ideas."
Another First Amendment objection is that authors and publishers in a
free society should be entitled to express and advocate their ideas without
being required to disclaim them via warnings and instructions.76
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark decision New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,77 held that civil liability awards cannot imper-
missibly restrict First Amendment rights. The Court stated:
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.
The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that [civil libel
law] invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more
inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.78
The "editorial intrusion" rule of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,79 can also be used to object to products liability for commercial
intellect. In Tornillo, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a
Florida "right of reply" statute that imposed misdemeanor liability for pub-
lishers that failed to grant political candidates equal access to their newspa-
pers.8 o The Court held that the Florida statute intruded into the editorial
process, violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free press.8  The
Tornillo objection to commercial intellect products liability is that, to the
extent such liability might compel a newspaper defendant to include addi-
tional material (e.g. warnings or instructions) with its product, the state
would be intruding upon its editorial function.82
Perhaps the most significant class of objections in the commercial intellect
context concerns the burdens, and thus arguably the indirect chilling effect,
placed upon authors and publishers who would be faced with a duty to in-
74. See, e.g., Chotin Transp., Inc. v. United States, 819 F.2d 1342, 1351 n.5 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987) ("[I]t is generally characterized as liability without fault
because there is no burden placed upon the plaintiff to prove negligence to impose liability
since negligence is not an issue.").
75. See, e.g., Hammerhead, 707 F.2d at 40; supra note 71; see also Walter v. Bauer, 439
N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. 1981), aff'd as modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1982);
supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
76. Jonathan M. Hoffman, From Random House to Mickey Mouse: Liability for Negligent
Publishing and Broadcasting, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 65, 87 (1985).
77. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
78. Id. at 277 (citing City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 90 (Ill. 1923)).
79. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
80. Id. at 244.
81. Id. at 258; see also Memphis Publishing Co. v. Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405,409-11 (W.D.
Tenn. 1982) (following Tornillo under similar circumstances).
82. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) ("Forcing an editor to print that which he otherwise would not
... was a restraint the First Amendment simply would not tolerate.").
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vestigate the substantive characteristics of their disseminated words or ideas.
Courts have uniformly rejected such a duty in various contexts.
8 3
For example, in Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co.,84 the Eastern District of
Louisiana rejected the argument that a newspaper publisher could be held
liable for a fraudulent advertisement it ran. 5 The court declared:
A newspaper has no duty, whether by way of tort or contract, to
investigate the accuracy of advertisements placed with it which are
directed to the general public, unless the newspaper undertakes to
guarantee the soundness of the products advertised .... To im-
pose the burden of investigating the accuracy of every ad would,
under ordinary circumstances, be too onerous.
86
Two years later, in Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,7 a plain-
tiff unsuccessfully sought to impose civil liability on the publisher of a "gun
for hire" advertisement.8" The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit again
denied this "duty to investigate" claim, citing the excessive burdens that
would result if a publisher were held accountable for the content of what he
or she published. 9
83. See infra text accompanying notes 84-98.
84. 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1987), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 921-22.
86. Id. at 922.
87. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
88. Id. at 831. The advertisement, which ran in the September, October, and November
1984 issues of the defendant's magazine, read: "EX-MARINES--67-69 'Nam Vets, EX-DI,
weapons specialist-jungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk assignments, U.S. or overseas." Id
89. A standard of conduct that imposes tort liability whenever the advertised prod-
uct "could reasonably be interpreted as an offer to engage in illegal activity"-or
might "relate to" criminal conduct-imposes an especially heavy [investigative] bur-
den.... Relatedly, the publication's editorial content would surely feel the economic
crunch from loss of revenue that would result if publishers were required to reject all
ambiguous advertisements.
Id. at 837; see also Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)
(rejecting the imposition of liability on a magazine publisher for allegedly defective products it
advertised). The court in Yuhas rejected plaintiffs' duty to investigate theory, stating: "To
impose the suggested broad legal duty upon publishers of nationally circulated magazines,
newspapers and other publications, would not only be impractical and unrealistic, but would
have a staggering adverse effect on the commercial world and our economic system." Id at
825; see also Suarez v. Underwood, 426 N.Y.S.2d 208, 211 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (refusing to impose
liability on a newspaper publisher for paid advertisements it ran for a hair implantation pro-
cess), aff'd, 449 N.Y.S.2d 438 (App. Div. 1981). Deferring to the analytical framework for the
tort of false advertising, the Suarez court stated that a "newspaper is only liable if it publishes a
false advertisement maliciously or with intent to harm another or acts with total reckless aban-
don. . . . 'Nor should the onerous burden be placed upon newspapers under ordinary
circumstances to conduct investigations in order to determine the effect of a questioned adver-
tisement.'" Id. at 210 (quoting Goldstein v. Garlick, 318 N.Y.S.2d 370, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1971)).
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In Walters v. Seventeen Magazine,' a California court rejected publisher
liability for the advertisement of a defective tampon. 9 The court stated that
the magazine did not endorse the product advertised, and therefore the pub-
lisher was not liable for its defects.9 2
The final objection in the commercial intellect field focuses on the concept
of privity. Although the law has formally abolished privity as a requirement
for recovery in tort,93 many courts addressing tort liability for the written
word have expressed concern for, in the words of a court still struggling
under the confines of the historic privity rule, "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 94 The court in
Yuhas v. Mudge" also expressed these concerns in rejecting liability for a
magazine publisher who allegedly advertised defective products.96 Simi-
larly, in Roman v. New York, 97 a New York court denied liability in the
context of a Planned Parenthood booklet discussing sterilization, stating:
"One who publishes a text cannot be said to assume liability for all 'misstate-
ments,' said or unsaid, to a potentially unlimited public for a potentially
unlimited period."9
90. 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1987).
91. Id. at 102.
92. Id. at 102-03. The court held:
Seventeen did not in any way sponsor or endorse products advertised in its pages....
In the absence of any cause of action supported by traditional theories, we are loathe
to create a new tort of negligently failing to investigate the safety of an advertised
product. Such a tort would require publications to maintain huge staffs scrutinizing
and testing each product offered. The enormous cost of such groups, along with
skyrocketing insurance rates, would deter many magazines from accepting advertis-
ing, hastening their demise from lack of revenue. Others would comply, but raise
their prices beyond the reach of the average reader. Still others would be wiped out
by tort judgments, never to revive. Soon the total number of publications in circula-
tion would drop dramatically.
Id.
93. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
94. Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (liability rejected for incorrect
accounting balance sheets); see, e.g., Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986);
Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
95. 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); supra note 89.
96. Id. at 825.
97. 442 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
98. Id. at 948.
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IV. RESPONDING TO THE OBJECTIONS: A DEFENSE OF COMMERCIAL
INTELLECT PRODUCTS LIABILITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
TORT, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, AND FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The constitutional and practical implications of holding the disseminator
of a word or idea liable merely in negligence, let alone in strict liability, have
appalled many courts99 and commentators."° Admittedly, advocating civil
liability for what could be termed "defective words or ideas" must give one
pause. Nevertheless, an analysis of the First Amendment objections, juxta-
posed with the existing limitations on the ambit of First Amendment protec-
tion and the demands of a fair and essential system of products liability,
leads to the conclusion that products liability for commercial intellect is both
analytically appropriate and constitutionally sound.
Although most of the objections leveled against liability in this context are
based on First Amendment considerations, this Article first analyzes tort
and products liability. This is an appropriate sequence given that free speech
considerations are not properly considered in a vacuum, but rather analyzed
in the context of the countervailing principles at hand.101
A. Support in Tort and Products Liability Jurisprudence
In order to build a case for the propriety of commercial intellect products
liability in the context of the existing law of tort and products liability, it is
necessary to first establish that this Article's definition does not denote serv-
ices, as opposed to products. Services cannot be the basis for a strict prod-
ucts liability claim.'° 2 This Article concludes that no item falling within the
definition of commercial intellect would be considered a service per se.
In order for a transaction to qualify as a service, there must be some per-
sonal or direct interaction with the consumer.'0 3 For example, while a med-
99. See supra text accompanying notes 30-98.
100. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 76, at 87.
101. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 132-
83, see also Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 863, 865 (S.D. Tex.
1988), rev'd, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990) ("the Court must
balance the free speech concerns of the First Amendment against the interest" asserted by the
plaintiff in tort); Kimberly Caswell, Soldiers of Misfortune: Holding Media Defendants Liable
for the Effects of Their Commercial Speech, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 222 (1989) (asserting
that free speech concerns are properly adjudicated by balancing them against state interests
associated with plaintiffs' claims).
102. John C. Wunsch, The Definition of a Productfor the Purposes of Section 402A, 50 INS.
COUNS. J. 344, 354 (1983); see, e.g., Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256, 260
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
103. See Dana Shelhimer, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions & the Strict Liability Di-
lemma, 43 Sw. L.J. 785, 793 (1989).
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ical doctor may write a diet book, the law would not classify the sale of that
book as a "service" because the doctor neither directly nor personally inter-
acted with the reader. Professional involvement in the creation of an item,
even where the professional normally offers his or her services in related
contexts, does not automatically qualify the item as a service.1 "4 Moreover,
that the item itself provides a service or can be incorporated into the provi-
sion of a service does not defeat its categorization as a product. °0
The product/service distinction becomes more problematic in traditional
products liability cases, as well as in commercial intellect cases, when the
item in question includes both a commercial component and some direct
service component. Such items are referred to as "hybrids."' 6 For exam-
ple, a computer software company may sell a software package and offer
accompanying installation, consultation, or repair services. Nevertheless,
this hybrid will generally be classified as a "product."' 7 The key to hybrid
104. See Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that,
because of mass-production, charts are not individually-tailored service arrangements).
105. As one commentator analogized: "The ultimate purpose of [a] car is transportation,
but the transaction involved is for the purchase of the item itself, not the transportation."
Susan Lanoue, Note, Computer Software & Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
439, 452 (1983).
106. Maloney, supra note 15, at 635-40.
107. Few cases have addressed products liability for computer software, and none in the
context of products liability. Most software categorization cases have arisen in the Article 2
Uniform Commercial Code context, focusing solely on whether software programs were goods
or services. See, e.g., Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675-76 (3d Cir. 1991) (de-
claring that, for U.C.C. purposes, software programs are goods, as they are tangible, moveable,
and available in the marketplace); RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that computer software at issue was a good, not a service, where service-type
characteristics of the sale were merely incidental); Systems Design & Management Info., Inc.
v. Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (hold-
ing software transaction to be a purchase of goods). But see Wharton Management Group v.
Sigma Consultants, Inc., 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 54 at *5 (holding, in circumstances nearly
identical to those in Advent, that the transaction involved a service for U.C.C. purposes since
"the means of transmission is not the object of the agreement"), aff'd 582 A.2d 936 (Del.
1990); Data Processing Servs. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318-19 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986) (holding same, given the custom nature of software and lack of simultaneous sale of
hardware); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (hold-
ing that contract for development of custom computer programming primarily involved a ser-
vice for U.C.C. purposes).
For useful articles addressing this subject, see Michael Gemignani, Product Liability &
Software, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173 (1981); Lanoue, supra note 105; David A.
Hall, Note, Strict Products Liability & Computer Software: Caveat Vendor, 4 COMPUTER/L.J.
373 (1983).
Other software cases have arisen in the tax context, where the goods vs. services distinction
invokes sales/use tax consequences. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust
Co., 464 A.2d 248, 259 (Md. 1983) (holding prepackaged software programs to be tangible for
purposes of sales/use tax issue); see also John Wei-Ching Kuo, Sales/Use Taxation of Software:
An Issue of Tangibility, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 125 (1987).
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characterization is the determination of whether the product or service com-
ponent predominates the transaction. 08
The definition of a commercial intellect product does not, itself, refer to
items which are inherently services, even if hybrids are occasionally in-
cluded. Therefore the traditional body of law regarding the product/service
distinction would and should be applied as always.
Accordingly, this Article now turns to a discussion of the policies underly-
ing torts in general and strict liability specifically. The aim of tort law is to
compensate individuals for losses they suffer through violations of their le-
gally recognized interests.1°9 Tort law is concerned with allocating losses
arising out of human activities. "o These general policy interests should ap-
ply equally to tangible products and commercial intellect products. There-
fore, courts' refusals to allow liability in this context directly frustrate those
basic principles.
In addition, the policy concerns underlying strict liability, expressed in the
comments to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, appear to
apply equally to both tangible products and commercial intellect products.
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been
said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and
consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility
toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured
by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely..' upon
the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused
by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
While tort liability for software defects would likely be relatively rare, software used in
medical services are potentially tort-inspiring. See Joseph P. Zammit & Mario A. Savio, TORT
LIABILITY FOR HIGH RISK COMPUTER SOFTWARE, PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks &
Literary Prop. Course Handbook series No. 239 1987), available in WL, PLI database, 239
PLI/Pat *373, *375 (discussing products liability suits involving allegedly defective computer-
ized therapeutic radiation machine and malfunctioning software causing truck, train, or plane
collisions); see also Scott v. White Trucks, 699 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1983) (regarding a products
liability suit involving computer-controlled anti-lock brakes on truck).
108. RRXIndus., 772 F.2d at 546; see also Dixon v. Four Seasons Bowling Alley, 424 A.2d
428, 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (holding that the use of a bowling ball in bowling
lanes was "incidental to the use of defendant's premises" and, as such, the ball was not a
product for purposes of strict liability).
109. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 5-6
(5th ed. 1984).
110. Id. at 6.
111. The reliance referred to here is a general, societal reliance. As the comments later
explain, "The rule stated in this Section does not require any reliance on the part of the con-
sumer upon the reputation, skill, or judgment of the seller who is to be held liable, nor any
representation or undertaking on the part of that seller." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT
§ 402A cmt. m (1965).
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market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such
products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market
the products.112
The comments also refer to:
the special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by
one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with
products which may endanger the safety of their persons and prop-
erty, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of
those who purchase such goods.
11 3
That the comments to Section 402A list only tangible items as examples of
applicable products, as noted by the Ninth Circuit in Winter v. G.P. Put-
nam's Sons,"' is not dispositive. The list was not represented as exhaustive.
Furthermore, the list was published more than twenty years ago, before seri-
ous efforts had been undertaken to impose any form of products liability for
words or ideas. Moreover, the underlying principles of Section 402A are
clearly structured as generally applicable and, as such, should apply equally
and forcefully to an actor engaged in the business of disseminating an auto-
mobile and one disseminating an encyclopedia.
In addition, the comments to Section 402A can be interpreted as already
supporting the inclusion of commercial intellect items in the ambit of strict
liability. In its discussion of product defect, the official comments declare:
"No reason is apparent for distinguishing between the product itself and the
container in which it is supplied; and the two are purchased by the user or
consumer as an integrated whole."" 5 Applying this language to a products
liability claim based upon the intellectual content of a "How To" book is
instructive. The features of that item, including the manner in which its
consumers would both perceive and use the book, reasonably speak to cate-
gorizing the physical book as the "container," leaving the words and ideas
included within that container to be fairly categorized as the true "product."
While this interpretation lacks previous support, the underlying principle is
sound: the "product" is the part or parts of an item which render value.
The imposition of products liability for commercial intellect is also wholly
consistent with the underlying policy considerations generally articulated by
the courts discussing strict liability. Those policy considerations, best cata-
112. Id. at cmt. c (footnote added).
113. Id at cmt. f.
114. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991); supra text accompanying notes 57-69.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (1965).
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logued in and often cited from the dissenting opinion of Lechuga, Inc. v.
Montgomery,' 16 include:
(1) The manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against their recurrence, which the consumer cannot do.
(2) The cost of injury may be overwhelming to the person injured
while the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
be distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
(3) It is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of defec-
tive products.
(4) It is in the public interest to place responsibility for injury
upon the manufacturer who was responsible for its reaching
the market.
(5) That this responsibility should also be placed upon the retailer
and wholesaler of the defective product in order that they may
act as the conduit through which liability may flow to reach
the manufacturer, where ultimate responsibility lies.
(6) That because of the complexity of present day manufacturing
processes and their secretiveness, the ability to prove negligent
conduct by the injured plaintiff is almost impossible.
(7) That the consumer does not have the ability to investigate for
himself the soundness of the product.
(8) That this consumer's vigilance has been lulled by advertising,
marketing devices and trademarks.' 
1 7
These policy concerns represent interests equally apparent in cases involv-
ing, for instance, a science textbook experiment resulting in foreseeable in-
jury, or a published recipe calling for a poisonous mushroom without
appropriate warning or instruction, and cases involving a swimming pool
without apparent depth information or a stepladder without appropriate
warnings. The legislative decision to place responsibility upon manufactur-
ers and others in the commercial chain is no less compelling or appropriate
simply because the product in question involves commercial intellect, rather
than a tangible characteristic. Clearly, those in the commercial chain re-
sponsible for the sale of a "How To" publication, especially the author and
the publisher, are in a far better position to know of the dangers associated
with their instructional piece, 118 and are generally in a far superior position
to design away, warn or instruct against, and insure or otherwise pay for
injuries proximately associated with those dangers." 9
116. 467 P.2d 256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); see, e.g., Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales,
513 P.2d 268, 272 (Mont. 1973); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732, 734 (N.M. 1972).
117. Lechuga, 467 P.2d at 261-62 (Jacobson, J. concurring) (citations omitted); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c.
118. Indeed, it is this superiority which generally underlies such a piece's marketing.
119. See also Jim Prince, Negligence: Liability for Defective Software, 33 OKLA. L. REV.
848, 851 n.43 (1980).
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That the current trend in tort law is a movement away from, rather than
toward, additional avenues of strict liability, especially for middlemen,'20 is
of little relevance to the propriety of imposing commercial intellect products
liability under the products liability system as it exists today. Even those
who would radically alter the strict liability rubric do not argue that it
should be applied inconsistently and arbitrarily.
The concept of consumer expectations lends additional support in tort and
products liability law for the characterization of commercial intellect as a
product for purposes of strict products liability. For example, in Ransome v.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 2 ' the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
electricity was a product for purposes of products liability, and approached
the question of what constituted a product by assessing consumer expecta-
tions. 122 The court referred to "the contemplation of the ordinary user" as
determinative. 123 The same inquiry into consumer expectations is appropri-
ate for determining products liability in the commercial intellect context.
The ordinary purchaser of a recipe book, as in Cardozo,124 would undoubt-
edly contemplate that his or her purchase encompassed the content of the
recipes, not just the physical book in which they were found.
Finally, the inability of courts to legitimately distinguish those cases
which have already imposed strict products liability in the realm of commer-
cial intellect 25 also supports the appropriateness of this doctrine.' 26 Be-
cause courts have not and can not legitimately distinguish those cases from
their own "nonproduct" categorizations,' 27 these cases must be considered,
in at least a limited sense, "good law."
B. Support in First Amendment Jurisprudence
Rather than engaging in traditional constitutional analysis, courts that
have rejected commercial intellect products liability on First Amendment
grounds have deferred to essentially unexplored principles.' 28 Even when
120. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Prod-
ucts Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263
(1991).
121. 275 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1979).
122. Id. at 643.
123. Id.
124. 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); see also supra text accompanying notes 2-
8.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
126. But see Bayman, supra note 14, at 573 (arguing that the chart cases are wrongly
decided).
127. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 50-56 (discussing Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d
123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (per curiam)).
128. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 30-69.
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employing a fault-based standard, these courts have voiced as their central
First Amendment concern the potential chilling effect generated by civil lia-
bility for the content of words or ideas.' 29 Courts have opined that the po-
tential for liability in this context is substantially greater than that for
tangible products, which would contribute further to any chilling effect.' 30
This concern has yet to be quantified in commercial intellect cases.' This
Article seeks to provide a reasoned framework with which courts can prop-
erly and substantively analyze the First Amendment implications of com-
mercial intellect products liability.
There is no doubt that the imposition of commercial intellect products
liability would result in some incursion into the realm of the First Amend-
ment. 132 However, First Amendment protections are by no means absolute.
In fact, there are several recognized forms of civil and criminal liability
which restrict free speech. In New York v. Ferber,'33 the United States
Supreme Court established that, when considering whether a category of
speech falls outside of the protections of the First Amendment, a court
should not simply defer to vague and unexplored concerns but must instead
engage in a three-step balancing of the competing interests involved. '31
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is clearly one of this na-
tion's most cherished freedoms. 3 Nevertheless, other significant federal
129. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991); Lewin v. Mc-
Creight, 655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987); L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629
F. Supp. 1425 (D. Conn. 1986); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985);
Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct.
1981), aff'd as modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1982); see also supra text accompanying
notes 57-69 (discussing Winter); supra note 45 (discussing Lewin); supra text accompanying
notes 46-49 (discussing L Cohen); infra note 157 (same); supra text accompanying notes 14,
31-34 (discussing Demuth); supra text accompanying notes 38-45 (discussing Aim); supra note
94 (discussing Ultramares); supra text accompanying notes 35-37 (discussing Walter).
130. See Lewin, 655 F. Supp. at 282; Demuth, 432 F. Supp. at 990; Aim, 480 N.E.2d at
1263; Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 44 1; see also supra note 45 (discussing Lewin); supra text accom-
panying notes 14, 31-34 (discussing Demuth); supra text accompanying notes 38-45 (discussing
Aim); supra note 94 (discussing Ultramares).
131. See generally supra text accompanying notes 70-98.
132. But see Lisa A. Powell, Note, Products Liability and the First Amendment: The Lia-
bility of Publishers for Failure to Warn, 59 IND. L.J. 503, 518 (1984) (asserting that the au-
thor's theory of liability, which addressed published speech that induced reliance and
dissuaded verification, is "free of the constitutional problems associated with the simple negli-
gence theory, because it does not impose liability on the basis of the content of the published
material. Liability is based on the material omitted, that is, the warning").
133. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
134. Id. at 764 (balancing of competing interests declared to be the appropriate constitu-
tional inquiry in decision as to whether child pornography was to be declared a new category
of unprotected speech).
135. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 21-1 at 576 (1978)
(the First Amendment is "the Constitution's most majestic guarantee").
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and state interests invariably and often intersect with First Amendment pro-
tections, necessitating legislative or judicial compromise after appropriate in-
quiry."6 In the words of Richard A. Posner:
Only dogmatists believe that the First Amendment should be inter-
preted literally. It is permissible to limit speech if the reasons for
doing so are strong enough, and they need not be reasons found in
the Constitution. The interests in liberty and security reflected in
state tort law ... are entitled to substantial consideration in deter-
mining whether a challenged law violates the First Amendment,
whether or not those interests are independently protected by the
Constitution against governmental invasion.13 7
There are, in fact, several specifically recognized exceptions to First
Amendment protection, many of which are torts. They include obscenity,
incitement, defamation (including libel and slander), invasion of privacy (in-
cluding disclosure of private facts, intrusion, false light, and commercial ex-
ploitation), injurious falsehood (including the ancient torts of slander of title
and trade libel), disruption of the classroom, misrepresentation, interference
with business relations (including interference with contract and interference
with prospective advantage), negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, alienation of affections, malicious prosecution, product disparage-
ment, conspiracy, complicity and other accomplice liability, antitrust viola-
tions under the Sherman Act, trade secret violations, crimes of omission,
solicitation of illegal activity, extortion or blackmail, criminal misrepresenta-
tion and criminal fraud, and contempt of court.
138
Each of these forms of criminal and civil liability indisputably involve
speech interests, but speech interests which have been deemed to be less
compelling than the various federal and state interests also at stake.13 9 In
the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,140 "it
is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times
and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."' 4 1 More recently,
136. See infra notes 140-83 and accompanying text.
137. Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
Sup. CT. REV. 173, 209 n.97; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 914 (1963) (stating that absolutists do not take the "ex-
treme and obviously untenable position" that "all words, writing and other communications
are, at all times and under all circumstances, protected from all forms of government
restraint").
138. See David A. Anderson, Tortious Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 71, 72 (1990).
139. Id.
140. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
141. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
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the Supreme Court has noted that "[e]ven a cursory reading of [our First
Amendment] opinions reveals that at times First Amendment values must
yield to other societal interests."'
' 42
The Ferber balancing test for the establishment of an exception to the
First Amendment begins with the recognition and characterization of the
state interests motivating the proposed liability.' 43 Commercial intellect
products liability is grounded in two state interests. The first interest is to
guarantee the physical safety of the state's citizens. The second state interest
is to guarantee its citizens' right to redress for injuries suffered in that juris-
diction. The United States Supreme Court has characterized these interests
as substantial. "
According to Ferber, the second step considers the nexus between the
state interests asserted and the proposed liability. ' 45 Applying the first state
interest in support of commercial intellect products liability, a state's interest
in assuring the physical safety of its citizens is furthered through increased
product safety. Liability in this context would effect risk avoidance and risk
minimization to the extent that it would result in safer designs or enhanced
warnings and instructions. Applying the second interest, a state can more
readily provide its citizens with a right to redress for injuries by expanding
products liability to include commercial intellect. As detailed above, con-
sumers injured by commercial intellect products are currently left without
any redress.'
46
Finally, the Ferber balancing test mandates a substantive inquiry into the
degree of constitutional infringement by the proposed exception.' 47  The
most troubling First Amendment incursion of commercial intellect products
liability is the so-called "duty to investigate" on the part of a publisher.14
The argument is that if a publisher were held liable for the content of its
publications, prudence would necessitate some level of investigation into the
142. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981).
143. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).
144. Farmer v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977); see also
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 502 (1987); Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 385, 392 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (holding that state interest of preventing harm from
coming to its public, even in commercial realm, was "particularly strong").
145. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8, 30-69.
147. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-64.
148. The alleged "duty to investigate" burden on the part of the author is noticeably absent
in such discussions. Perhaps this lack of concern is procedural, given the infrequency with
which authors are defendants in the reported cases. Or perhaps the lack of concern is substan-
tive, including either a perceived insignificance of that burden when placed at the author's




hazards posed by such publications.14 9 Courts addressing the issue have
uniformly rejected, with little or no substantive exploration, such a duty to
investigate as impermissibly chilling and deterring speech. 150
Admittedly, a de facto duty to investigate would most likely follow adop-
tion of the commercial intellect products liability doctrine. Publishers
clearly would face some additional incentive to assess the substance of what
they publish and its potential risks. To some extent, however, this duty
could be minimized or avoided through enhanced marketing information
such as instructions or warnings regarding the use of appropriate additional
input regarding the use of the product. Essentially, such a tactic would at-
tempt to expressly shift the investigative burden to the product consumers.
Still, instructions or warnings cannot always deflect strict products liability
for what must be said to be a defective design.' 5 For example, an author or
publisher could effectively warn that a mushroom called for in a recipe can
only be safely eaten after it is cooked; he or she could not likely "warn
away" liability for a book on how to build a chair which failed to describe a
safe blueprint. Publishers thus would be unable to avoid some duty to inves-
tigate. In addition, for those publishers who, whether for marketing pur-
poses or otherwise, would choose not to warn against reliance on what they
are publishing, some duty to investigate would admittedly be their safest,
albeit voluntary, course of action.
Given this admitted duty, the Ferber analysis then asks whether such a
limited duty to investigate, to the extent it might chill or deter speech, would
outweigh the state interests involved so as to offend the Constitution. 152 A
substantive exploration of the likely magnitude of this duty and the attend-
ant constitutional implications suggests that it would not.
First, the law should not ignore the extent to which both an author and a
publisher already perform some measure of investigation into the verity, ef-
fectiveness, or comprehensiveness of the publications involved in this in-
quiry.'13 Natural incentives, including profit and self-respect, ensure this
149. See supra text accompanying notes 83-98.
150. See, e.g., Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990); Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp 921 (E.D. La.
1987); Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1987); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d
824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); Suarez v. Underwood, 426 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct.
1980); see also supra text accompanying notes 87-89 (discussing Eimann); infra note 191
(same); supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (discussing Pittman); supra text accompanying
notes 91-92 (discussing Walters); supra note 89 (discussing Yuhas and Suarez); supra text ac-
companying notes 95-96 (discussing Yuhas).
151. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1976) (even a product whose
dangers are open and obvious can have a defective design).
152. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
153. It is apparently not uncommon for an author to sign a contract with a publisher which
includes an indemnification clause warranting, among other things, that "any recipe, formula
19921
Catholic University Law Review
measure of investigation. To the extent that the author or publisher does not
so investigate, or fails to investigate at the same level as he or she would if
faced with products liability for commercial intellect, how factually signifi-
cant is that supplementary burden?
At this point, the duty to investigate can be analyzed only theoretically,
rather than empirically, since the practical burdens attributable to commer-
cial intellect products liability would vary among publishers and among
products. As stressed in Ferber, if "the evil to be restricted so overwhelm-
ingly outweighs the expressive interests ... at stake.... no process of case-
by-case adjudication is required."' 54 This supplementary burden might be
characterized, in the words of Walters,"'5 as requiring "publications to
maintain huge staffs scrutinizing and testing each product offered." 156 How-
ever, this "staff" may already exist to one degree or another. Even if not,
this additional staff would most likely not have to perform excessively bur-
densome research. Publishers and authors are, at least minimally, already
equipped to examine the reasonably foreseeable ramifications of their own
wares. But even to the extent they are not, a court should note that these
actors would certainly be in a far better position to investigate than most of
the product's consumers, both in terms of information and resources.
Courts must also keep in mind that these issues will only arise when an
author and publisher have introduced into the stream of commerce some
form of intellect, reasonably expected to be relied upon as a blueprint and in
fact deriving its value to the author and publisher because of that reliance,
which intellect unreasonably and proximately causes harm.
The final analytical step concerns the extent to which this practical burden
would chill and deter speech so as to offend the Constitution. This determi-
nation is best analyzed through a basic review of the United States Supreme
Court's treatment of commercial speech. This Article does not suggest that
commercial intellect products, motivated in at least large part by financial
gain, are properly classified as commercial speech since they go beyond the
mere proposal of a commercial transaction. 157 Still, the two doctrines share
a number of common, relevant attributes which make analogy instructive.
or instruction contained in the work is not injurious to the user." Kathleen McDermott, Note,
Liability for Negligent Dissemination of Product Information: A Proposalfor Assuring a More
Responsible Writership, 18 FORUM 557, 569 n.58 (1983) (quoting Spieser, Insuring Authors: A
New Proposal, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, May 5, 1982 at 28).
154. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
155. 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1987).
156. Id. at 102.
157. See Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 664 (1989); Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (even the most inclusive of definitions
of commercial speech requires advertising form in addition to profit motive and specific con-
tent requirements); Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891-92 (1982).
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The Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment can
well abide the regulation of commercial speech,"' 8 which is generally defined
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and his
audience,"' 59 and "does 'no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion.' 60 The rationale for this incursion into the First Amendment is
based on the characterization that commercial speech possesses both
"greater objectivity and hardiness" than traditional speech. 61  As a result,
the Court has noted, these attributes "may make it less necessary to tolerate
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker. They may also make
it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or
include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are neces-
sary to prevent its being deceptive."'
62
The reasoning that constitutionally permits commercial speech liability
holds true for commercial intellect products liability as well. Commercial
intellect products, as entrants into the stream of commerce, are also moti-
vated in large part by the same profit motive which is said to make commer-
cial speech so "hardy."' 63 Moreover, a commercial intellect defect can be
more objectively determined than would be possible with "core" speech:
that is, the underlying question before the trier of fact would be whether or
not the product "blueprint" failed to "work" such that it could be found to
be defective.
Thus, as with commercial speech, the chilling effect in the context of com-
mercial intellect will be substantially less than in "core" speech contexts.
Indeed, in Brocklesby v. United States,' an aeronautical chart case, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared that requiring a chart man-
One commercial intellect product which can also be characterized as involving commercial
speech is a credit report. See, e.g., L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp.
1425, 1431 (D. Conn. 1986).
158. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770-72 (1976); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 445, 456 (1978) (com-
mercial speech is afforded a "limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v.
Public Svc. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (citing same); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68 (same);
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-80 (1989) (same).
159. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
160. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); see also Chralik, 436 U.S. at 454; Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,
680 F. Supp. 863, 865 n.l (S.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
161. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
162. Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted).
163. Id.
164. 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1985), amended on other grounds, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
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ufacturer to produce a safe product would not significantly chill free speech,
even assuming that the case involved commercial speech.' 65 In addition,
since commercial intellect liability would likely result primarily in greater
attention to warnings and instructions, it is worth noting that manufactur-
ers' directions sold with his or her product have never been held to merit
First Amendment protection.
66
Furthermore, the Supreme Court gives commercial speech regulation a
great amount of deference. State regulations were originally bound by the
narrow test put forward by the Court in 1980 in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Service Commission,167 which read:
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity, the government's power is more circumscribed. The State
must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be
in proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must
be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal. Compliance with
this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the re-
striction must directly advance the state interest involved; the reg-
ulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or
remote support for the government's purpose. Second, if the gov-
ernmental interest could be served as well by a more limited re-
striction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot
survive.' 68
However, in 1989, the Court clarified and substantially eased the "least
restrictive" and "direct" relationship requirements between the state interest
and the regulation in question, now requiring only "a 'fit' between the legis-
lature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends."' 69 Moreover,
this "fit" was characterized as
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not neces-
sarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in propor-
tion to the interest served,' that employs not necessarily the least
restrictive means but, .... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental
decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be
employed. 1
70
Given the level of deference now afforded state regulation of commercial
speech, the amount of chilling and deterring of speech in the commercial
165. Id. at 803.
166. McDermott, supra note 153, at 572.
167. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
168. Id. at 564.
169. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
170. Id. (citations omitted).
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intellect products liability context would most likely pass constitutional
muster.
The potential "intrusion" into the editorial function of publishers associ-
ated with products liability for commercial intellect is an additional concern
raised by the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.'7 1 Tornillo
is readily distinguishable from the commercial intellect context, however,
because it involved "core" speech, not commercial speech. Tornillo involved
a "right-to-reply" statute granting political candidates a right to equal space
to reply to criticism and attacks on their record published by newspapers.172
However, one year earlier, the Supreme Court had reached the opposite
holding when it reviewed the issue of editorial intrusion in the commercial
speech context. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,173 the Court held that an ordinance which had been construed as
generally prohibiting newspapers from carrying "help-wanted" adver-
tisements in gender-designated columns did not violate the First
Amendment. 
174
Nothing in Tornillo vitiates the holding of Pittsburgh Press. 17- Thus, some
degree of editorial intrusion in the context of commercial speech, and, by
analogy, commercial intellect, is constitutionally permissible.' 76 Moreover,
newspaper publishers and editors, by virtue of their position, are not likely to
find themselves to be defendants in a commercial intellect case since neither
news and feature articles nor advertisements would be classified as
products. 177
In addition, the contours of the commercial intellect doctrine, itself, con-
form to the Supreme Court's preferences for the manner of restriction em-
ployed. In those instances when the Constitution is said to sanction "the
prevention and punishment" or other regulation of speech, courts have
granted heavy preference to those limitations which are well defined, gener-
ally applicable, and as unobtrusive as is feasible. In New York v. Ferber, the
Court supported liability for child pornography where the criminal statute
had "adequate definitions."' 78 In Linmark Associates v. Township of Wil-
lingboro,179 the Court reiterated that "laws regulating the time, place, or
manner of speech stand on a different footing from laws prohibiting speech
171. 418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
172. Id. at 244.
173. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
174. Id. at 391.
175. See News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 693 F. Supp. 1066, 1071
(S.D. Fla. 1987).
176. Id.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 181-92.
178. 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
179. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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altogether."1 0 Recently, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,18 1 the Supreme
Court allowed a state's promissory estoppel law to apply to the press, em-
phasizing that the law was constitutionally permissible since it was one of
general applicability and it did not target or single out the press."8 2
Accordingly, commercial intellect products liability is an appropriately
tailored exception to the First Amendment. First, the doctrine would not
prohibit speech, but would only indirectly affect the manner and perhaps the
place in which affected speech is exercised by subjecting its disseminators to
liability only if their speech proximately causes injury. Second, as a tort, it is
a law of general applicability, exposing both private citizens and publishers,
not exclusively the media, to liability. Finally, the doctrine contains com-
plete and adequate definitions.' 83
V. THE CONTOURS OF THE COMMERCIAL INTELLECT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY DOCTRINE
A. "Product" Defined
This Article proposes defining commercial intellect as:
Any item introduced into the stream of commerce, including the
intangible (or intellectual) aspects of the item, where those aspects:
(1) contribute to the product's economic value, and (2) are reason-
ably expected by an ordinary consumer to be an integrated method
or blueprint that is directly useable, as opposed to indirectly usea-
ble only after further input on that same matter, and as opposed to
merely pondered and appreciated.
While case-by-case determinations of whether an item is classified as a
product for purposes of this doctrine naturally must be made as a matter of
law, the list of items would most likely include: skill or advice books, video-
tapes and manuals; computer software; cookbooks; recommended experi-
ments in scientific and educational publications; navigational charts;
architectural plans; technical encyclopedias and manuals; credit reports; and
any portion of a publication which included any of the above products for its
consumers' use. The intellectual substance of these goods is, by its very na-
ture, intended to be directly useable without the need for further input
within the ambit of that particular "blueprint." The disseminator of one of
these goods must reasonably expect a fundamentally different response from
its consumers than does the disseminator of, for example, a work of fiction
180. Id. at 93 (holding that ordinance prohibiting the posting of real estate "for sale" and
"sold" signs violated the First Amendment).
181. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
182. Id. at 2515.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 181-92.
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because these goods engender, and the disseminator must reasonably expect,
reliance. More importantly, these goods are generally purchased by con-
sumers with the reasonable expectation that they are "blueprints" which can
be directly relied upon (concepts of comparative fault notwithstanding) to
function in a nondefective manner for the reasonably foreseeable purposes
engendered by their disseminators' marketing schemes.
As one example, in the case of a cookbook, the economic value of the good
is a function of both the physical characteristics of the book itself and the
intellectual content of its recipes. A recipe is reasonably expected by a con-
sumer to be directly useable without additional and potentially supplanting
input, rather than only being capable of being read and contemplated as
information for information's sake. In contrast, that part of a published
work that advocates corporal punishment would only be useable indirectly,
and thus would not be a product for purposes of this doctrine. A consumer
would not reasonably foreseeably rely upon such information or opinion as
an integrated "final word" on corporal punishment and mechanically follow
it as a plan or blueprint. Rather, a reasonable consumer would only read
and intellectually process that information before, if at all, using it indi-
rectly, subsequent to the assimilation of other input on that same subject.
A more complex example is a book like Final Exit,I 4 the best-seller which
not only advocates the right to suicide in instances of terminal illness, but
details several ways in which to accomplish it. Under the commercial intel-
lect doctrine, that portion of the book which advocates the right to die
would not be considered a product, as intellectual advocacy, itself, is not
reasonably foreseeably a blueprint. However, that portion of the book which
provides detailed instructions on how to accomplish suicide would be consid-
ered a product. Those instructions are reasonably expected by an ordinary
consumer to be an integrated method or blueprint that is directly useable.
Such detailed "how to" instructions are certainly not received by consumers
as material to be merely pondered and appreciated or even as indirectly use-
able, only after further instruction.
Still more complex examples include the "self-help" variety "How To"
books. Particularly compelling titles include: How to Make a Man Fall in
Love With You: The Fail Proof, Fool Proof Method, I8 5 How to Sell Any-
thing to Anybody,' 8 6 How to Create Your Own Fad and Make a Million
184. DEREK HUMPHREY, FINAL EXIT (1991).
185. TRACY CABOT, HOW TO MAKE A MAN FALL IN LOVE WITH You: THE FAIL
PROOF, FOOL PROOF METHOD (1984).
186. JOE GIRARD, How TO SELL ANYTHING TO ANYBODY (1977).
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Dollars,'8 7 and How to Fire Your Boss.'8 ' Whether these books will be ad-
judged products depends upon the nature of the particular book. If the book
merely gives advice and suggestions (e.g., "talk about sports and wear lots of
makeup"), rather than a blueprint, it would most likely not be categorized as
a product by a court.
It is also useful to delineate what is not a product under this doctrine,
despite certain similarities. This list includes those items which are entered
into the stream of commerce, contain words or ideas which contribute to the
item's economic value, and are reasonably foreseeably useable by its consum-
ers. The difference with this list, however, is that consumers do not reason-
ably use these items directly. That is, the reasonable consumer does not
expect these items to be integrated or "final" information which is useable
without further input on the subject addressed by the contents of the item.
Examples include purely informational, fictional, or opinion-based items,
publications, or purchased broadcasts," 9 traditional advertisements, and
certifications or "seals of approval." For example, a magazine or newspaper
article reporting on (not just substantially reprinting) excerpts from the sui-
cide book Final Exit, would not constitute a product. The reasonably fore-
seeable function of such a report would be informational, rather than
directly useable.
Disseminators of items in this list can still be subject to liability, of course.
However, given that these items cannot appropriately be considered prod-
ucts because their only reasonable use is indirect, the proper theory of liabil-
ity would likely fall under the established tort of incitement. Incitement
generally includes speech which is "directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and [is] likely to produce such action."'' That type of
187. KEN HAKUTA, HOW TO CREATE YOUR OWN FAD AND MAKE A MILLION DOL-
LARS (1988).
188. CHRIS MALBURG, HOW TO FIRE YOUR Boss (1991).
189. For example, in a science textbook, that portion of the book which purely provides
information (e.g., a chapter on ontogeny) is not a product subject to commercial intellect prod-
ucts liability, where that part of the same textbook which proposes an experiment is a commer-
cial intellect product. The same would be true for a magazine with both feature articles and
recipes. That portion of the magazine including feature articles which purely provide informa-
tion, fiction, or opinions would not be a product subject to commercial intellect products liabil-
ity while the recipes would be so categorized.
190. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (per curiam)).
For examples of cases which do not fit into the commercial intellect products liability doc-
trine but are more properly litigated in the context of incitement, see Olivia N. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (addressing plaintiff's allegation
that defendant's television broadcast of particular form of sexual assault in film drama incited
assailants to similarly assault her), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982); Sakon v. PepsiCo, Inc.,
553 So. 2d 163, 166 (Fla. 1989) (holding television advertiser has no duty to viewers for cola
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speech is used only indirectly, since a person swayed by the speech reason-
ably takes into account additional information before acting. 91
Once an item is classified as a product, section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts applies as always. That is, the seller must be engaged in
the business of selling such a product and the product is expected to and
actually reaches the user or consumer without substantial change in the con-
dition in which it was sold. 192
B. "Defect" Defined
Having explored the analytical framework for determining what is and
what is not a product under this doctrine, the next step is to define "defect"
in relation to that part of a product subject to liability as commercial intel-
lect. Subjecting the expanded category of products proposed in this Article
to strict liability would not require a new measure or expanded definition of
product defect. The traditional notions of product defect 93 should apply in
their current form in commercial intellect products liability cases.
Defect in the context of commercial intellect products would be defined
within the accepted definitions of defect already supplied by modem prod-
commercial depicting jumping over a lake with a bicycle); Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378,
379 (6th Cir. 1990) (addressing a suit against manufacturer of the game "Dungeons & Drag-
ons" for alleged causal link between themes of game and youth's suicide); Yuhas v. Mudge,
322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1974) (addressing suit against magazine publisher who
placed paid fireworks advertisement in one of its magazines where codefendants purchased
fireworks after seeing advertisements, and injured plaintiff bystanders when fireworks ex-
ploded); Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 863, 864 (S.D. Tex. 1988)
(addressing suit against publisher of "gun for hire" advertisement where husband of the de-
ceased plaintiff read and subsequently contracted to have the deceased murdered), rev'd, 880
F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990); Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal.
Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (addressing suit against certifier responsible for "Good House-
keeping Seal" of approval where plaintiff purchased allegedly defective shoes certified by this
seal); Howard v. Poseidon Pools, Inc., 506 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (addressing suit
against certifier of swimming pools and equipment where plaintiff purchased allegedly defec-
tive pool approved by defendant), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 522 N.Y.S. 2d 388 (App. Div.
1987).
191. For example, a person in a crowd listening to an exhortation to storm the local jail
necessarily incorporates other information into his or her decision to participate. Such addi-
tional input could include his or her own thoughts and values as well as the opinions of others.
In contrast, a person following a recipe in a recipe book would -reasonably not incorporate
additional input when following that recipe, even if such additional input were available.
Again, the difference is clearest when focusing on whether consumers would reasonably apply
the speech without additional input.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(a-b) (1965).
193. "Traditional" defect analysis includes whatever theory a given jurisdiction already
utilizes, including risk-benefit defect analysis, see, e.g., Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. & Auto
Parts, Inc., 745 P.2d 986, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), consumer expectation defect analysis, see,
e.g., Falk v. Keene Corp., 782 P.2d 974, 980 (Wash. 1989), or a combination thereof, see, e.g.,
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978).
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ucts liability law. Comment g to section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts defines defect as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."1 94 Comment i de-
fines "unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its character-
istics." 195 Courts often combine or replace this "consumer expectation" ap-
proach with a risk-utility test for defect, which, in various forms, essentially
compares the risk or danger of the product's alleged defect with the costs of
avoiding that risk. 196
Putting aside the traditional issues of causation and injury for this discus-
sion, a commercial intellect product which fails to perform according to rea-
sonable expectations must be said to be defective. That the product is
intellectually based would be immaterial to establishing defect. Courts can
and should apply the appropriate defect approach to the intellectual aspect,
rather than the physical aspect, of the product alleged to be defective.
Since the question of defect is primarily one for the finder of fact,, 97 the
determinations of defect in most cases must be left to individual litigation.
For example, consider most skill or craft advice books, which are commonly
referred to as "How To" books. These publications generally promise that,
upon use of the author's blueprint, some goal can be achieved by the user/
reader. A book entitled How To Build A Chair should be considered defec-
tive if strict adherence to the author's instructions unreasonably fails to pro-
duce a functional chair, and proximately causes an injury compensable in
tort. Once verified factually, a finder of fact would likely find that this prod-
uct was defective as defined within each jurisdiction. The same approach
may be used to determine the defectiveness of recipes in a cookbook. For
example, in easy cases, tortious injury may be proximately caused by the
defect of calling for poisonous ingredients. The more difficult, but nonethe-
less perfectly manageable, cases involve recipes which fail to warn of the
need to thoroughly cook pork before consumption.
There are no analytical barriers to applying standard defect analysis to
products included in the rubric of commercial intellect liability. As always,
defendants would still have the opportunity to establish adequate marketing,
either warnings or instructions, or nondefective design. For example, a pub-
lisher of a diet book could argue that the book came with sufficient warnings
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
195. Id. at cmt. i.
196. See, e.g., Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1989).
197. See, e.g., Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1991); Brooks
v. Eugene Burger Management Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 756, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). But cf
Linegar v. Armour, Inc., 909 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1990).
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regarding consultation with a physician (marketing) or that the diet, when
properly adhered to, was not injurious (design). Even manufacturing de-
fects, for example, substantive mistakes or typographical errors, can be liti-
gated in this context just as traditional manufacturing defects are litigated.
The emphasis in a commercial intellect products liability defect inquiry sim-
ply shifts the traditional defect focus to the intellectual, rather than the phys-
ical, component at issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The equitable imposition of strict liability, in itself, is an appropriate ob-
jective. A consumer physically injured by words or ideas sold as a product is
as much injured, and as much deserving of recompense, as someone injured
by a tangible aspect of a product. Likewise, an actor who sells words or
ideas as a product should not be able to insulate himself or herself from strict
liability when those words or ideas cause an otherwise compensable injury
simply because of the communicative nature of that product. The doctrine
of commercial intellect liability constitutionally encompasses the eminent
right of a state to provide redress to its injured citizens and the traditional
rights of those injured citizens to seek redress through a principled rule of
law.
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